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1 Introduction
The (de)stabilizing role of scal and monetary policies can be assessed by considering the role
of exogenous policies as a source of business cycle uctuations and also the contribution of
endogenous policies to dampen them. These aspects depend in turn on how active policies
have been and the impact on output they had. The goal of this paper is to present evidence
about such questions for the US taking as a reference data for 1955 to 2005. Structural change
over the period is accounted for on the basis of split-sample (separating the pre- and post-1980
periods) and rolling-sample estimates. There is a great deal of literature seeking to determine
changes in the way monetary policy was conducted and its e¤ect on the economy, including
Bovin (2006), Bovin and Giannoni (2006), Primiceri (2005) and Sims and Zha (2006) among
others. Such an analysis has been much less explored for the scal side.1 My paper takes up
this task and focuses, in addition, on aspects arising from the joint consideration of scal and
monetary policies. From the empirical viewpoint, it also relates to the literature on the great
moderation (see, for instance, Stock and Watson (2002), Ahmed et al. (2004), Canova (2009)
and references therein), as far as the role played by policymakers in it is concerned.
The analysis is made in the framework of a simple, textbook-like macroeconomic system with
ve equations: three of them are structural - a monetary policy rule and equations for government
revenue and expenditure, the latter capturing both the reaction function of scal authorities and
automatic responses to macroeconomic variables. There are two additional equations which can
be seen as solved out versions, respectively, for GDP and ination, of standard IS and aggregate
supply curves. The disturbances in these last equations do not have, contrary to the policy
disturbances, a structural interpretation (that is, I do not disentangle aggregate supply and
private aggregate demand innovations). This set-up is described in Section 3 and has some
common points with that in Blanchard and Watson (1984), one of the earliest contributions to
the SVAR literature.
1Two exceptions are Auerbach (2002) and Taylor (2000), but they di¤er substantially from the approach
followed here, among other things in that they estimate single-equation relationships.
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The macroeconomic system is cast and estimated in the form of an identied VAR. Thus
I have to tackle joint identication of monetary and scal policy innovations and this links
with a few studies that dealt with the same question, such as Perotti (2004) and Canzoneri
et al. (2002), appearing in the wake of literature considering each policy in isolation. The most
prominent simultaneity issue arising in this context - the co-movement between taxes and the
monetary policy instrument, the federal funds rate - has, however, not received much attention
before. I model this carefully by allowing a contemporaneous nonzero elasticity of taxes to the
short-term interest rate. Some of the contemporaneous coe¢ cients in the equations for the scal
variables are calibrated using non-sample information, following Blanchard and Perotti (2002).
This requires that I generalize the OECD method to derive the elasticity of personal income
taxes to GDP that they use, to encompass the semi-elasticities to ination and the short-term
interest rate.
A general remark about the approach followed in this paper is that I take it as given that
endogenous and exogenous policies have real e¤ects and attempt to assess them. Also as pre-
liminary point, Section 2 addresses the ability of identied VARs to estimate the e¤ects of scal
policy on GDP, which has been forcefully questioned (Ramey (2008)) on the grounds that SVAR
scal disturbances are anticipated by agents.
Section 4 addresses the rst question above, that is, the contribution of exogenous policies
to the volatility of output. The key nding is that policy disturbances both on the scal and
monetary sides were much less destabilizing in the second part of the sample. Such a result was to
an important extent brought about by a smaller impact of those disturbances on output. In fact,
there is evidence of a generalized weakening of exogenous policiese¤ectiveness - particularly
marked for taxes and transfers which feature a perverse impact on output in the more recent
period. Improved policy in the form of a smaller variance of the shocks is also found to have
contributed to the decline in volatility in the case of the federal funds rate and government
spending.
Section 5 presents additional empirical results concerning the behavior of monetary and scal
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policies. In particular, their responsiveness to the economy is addressed. Changes in the federal
funds rate and taxes net of transfers are dominated by the respective systematic components.
By contrast, the exogenous component dominates uctuations in government expenditure. As
far as structural change is concerned, the sensitiveness of taxes net of transfers to economic
developments is found to have increased in recent decades. A similar analysis for the funds rate
was not conclusive. Another issue addressed is the feedback between the two budget variables.
The results in the rst subsample, ending in 1980, indicate a tendency for changes in expenditure
to lead changes in taxes, and capture a budget-balancing movement in the short-term. In
contrast, results for the subsequent period show a long-lasting divergence between the two
budget variables. I interpret this as reecting the conduct of debt stabilization policies from
early to mid-eighties on and, toward the end of the sample, «spending the surplus» policies.
Section 6 attempts to quantify the stabilizing role played by endogenous policies. This is done
by means of counterfactual simulations. Specically, I simulate the system under counterfactual
assumptions which are, respectively, absence of the exogenous component and of the endogenous
component of policy. By comparing the historical behavior of the variables with the implied
behavior, I am able to break down actual changes in policy variables during contractions into the
endogenous and exogenous components, and measure the output loss avoided at trough for each
of them. I do this for the eight NBER business cycle contractions since 1955, the beginning of the
sample. There is evidence that taxes and transfers were the most important force attenuating the
severity of recessions up to the eighties. They have markedly lost e¤ectiveness over time, however,
in parallel with the same phenomenon for the respective exogenous shocks. The o¤setting
e¤ect of systematic monetary policy was comparatively smaller in the past and this appears to
be accounted for by a slow buildup of the output response against the length of the average
recession. Except for more protracted recessions, full impact tends be felt already at the initial
stages of the recovery. Government spending has played a minor stabilizing role throughout the
whole sample period.
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2 On the meaning of scal policy shocks and the ability of
SVARs to capture them
A correct measurement of the e¤ects of scal policy in an SVAR context requires, in the rst
place, that the shocks are exogenous in relation to the variable, say GDP, on which the impact is
being determined. Meaning that the portion of the scal variables labelled as the «shock» must
not respond to GDP nor, more generally, to variables correlated with it, such as interest rates and
prices. As a rst point, it is important to ascertain whether there are scal policy actions meeting
such requirements in practice. Romer and Romer (2009b) investigated the legislated tax changes
in the US since World War II and distinguished between four types of motivations behind them:
to react to the business cycle, to nance changes in spending, to raise long-run growth and to cope
with an inherited decit (which could be also stated as to cope with growing debt). The Romers
classify the last two as exogenous with respect to output uctuations, and show that they have
been clearly more prevalent than their endogenous counterparts throughout the postwar period.
Turning to budget outlays, examples of exogenous, or at least party exogenous, interventions
are also not di¢ cult to nd. These include, for instance, build-ups in defense spending and the
creation and extension of certain social programs largely unrelated to the business cycle (like
Medicaid). Another scal intervention concerns the normally annual decision about across-the-
board adjustments to the pay of government employees. Such adjustments are partly endogenous
to past ination to the extent that they make up for it (adding to the other increases in pay
related to the advancement of employees), but they are also determined by exogenous policy
goals as, for instance, expenditure restraint or achieving wage rates comparable with those in
the private sector. The last kind of goals can be very important in practice. This can be seen by
analyzing the pay adjustments in the General Schedule which covers most Federal government
civilian employees, in the years spanning since mid-fties.2 Until the beginning of the seventies,
a time when the comparability principle ranked high on the political agenda (see Smith (1982)),
2The Federal Civilian Workforce Statistics (US O¢ ce of Personnel Management) present a chronology of the
General Schedule Pay Legislation since 1945.
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the cumulative increase stood over 70 p.p. above the variation in the CPI. By contrast, during
the high ination period from 1973 to 1981 that followed, pay updates fell systematically short
of the rise in prices (more than 50 p.p. below, in cumulative terms). Since 1982 the adjustments
have been more in line with ination (negative di¤erence of 19 p.p. in relation to the CPI
from 1983 to 2005). Changes in social transfers and purchases of goods and services undertaken
in response to business cycle conditions have been infrequent and small over the last decades
(Romer and Romer (1994)). Hence, contrary to monetary policy for which the existence of
exogenous interventions has been a matter of debate, in the case of scal policy many actions
fall within this category, even if identication assumptions are generally needed to isolate them.
A second requirement for a correct measurement of the e¤ects of scal policy is that the
timing of the shocks corresponds to the moment in which they actually impacted economic
activity. If scal shocks, albeit exogenous, can be anticipated by agents and if agents modify
their behavior accordingly, identied VARs will still not estimate properly their e¤ects on GDP.
This issue is clearly of potential importance in the case of scal policy because changes to
taxes and spending typically have to go through a legislative process, and thus agents get
information about them about them ahead of the implementation. The problem was recognized
in earlier SVAR papers on the e¤ects of scal policy (Blanchard and Perotti (2002), see also
the discussion in Perotti (2007)). At the same time, the event study literature (see Ramey
and Shapiro (1998) and subsequent work in the same vein) argued that anticipation e¤ects are
likely to invalidate inferences relating to scal policy drawn from SVARs. As it is known, this
literature has focused on the impact of increases in defense spending in the wake of the major
postwar military episodes3, and dates the shocks when the news about the likely rise in defense
spending rst came up in the media. Since I employ the SVAR methodology, it is appropriate
to put forward some considerations about how serious the issue of anticipation may be.
3Although it is adequate to focus on the e¤ects of military episodes, given the added claim to exogeneity, it
is often thought that shocks to purchases of goods and services relate only to defense contracts. To put things
in perspective, purchases related to defense (as measured by NIPAs) are about 1/3 of the total and, excluding
compensation of employees from the aggregate, about 2/5. In terms of the contribution to the overall variance
(series in real and per capita terms, sample 1955:1-2005:4) the defense component has a coe¢ cient of variation of
0.13, much smaller than the one of non-defense expenditure which is 0.36.
6
Note, to start with, that neither the SVAR nor the event study approach present evidence as
to the importance of anticipation e¤ects. One way to get it is through micro studies addressing
the actual behavior of agents in face of information about pending scal shocks. There is a large
body of empirical evidence about the way households react to changes in taxes (also some about
the reaction to changes in social benets and, in any case, one might expect that the same type
of behavior applies in this case). This has been gathered by the literature documenting the
so-called «natural tax experiments» (see Johnston et al. (2006) and the references they cite),
and provides support to the hypothesis that tax changes do a¤ect householdsbehavior at the
time revenue is collected. For instance, predictable tax liabilities and refunds have signicant
contemporaneous impacts on consumption. It is illustrative, in this respect, that although
Romer and Romer (2009b) follow a methodology akin to the event study approach, they date
«their» benchmark tax shocks according to when the legislated changes impacted revenue. In
the same vein, one can assume that households do not smooth consumption in anticipation
of small changes in disposable income resulting from shocks to compensation of government
employees.
No comparable micro evidence as to the behavior of rms in face of information about
pending scal changes is (to the best of my knowledge) available. The relevant budget items in
this respect are, on the receipt side, taxes on prots and part of social security contributions and,
on the outlay side, intermediate consumption and investment. The event study approach has
chiey raised the anticipation issue in relation to military component of these last items. I note
that the timing of shocks followed by that approach is not undisputable. Indeed, considerable
uncertainty remains at the point the news about the likely military build-up rst come up,
for instance, as to its actual size, the weapon systems government will purchase, who among
competing contractors will be chosen as the supplier, and so on. Thus, it may well be that the
relevant timing is when contracts are awarded. It is not unreasonable to think that anticipation
matters more for the nancial markets, which react to news than for the labor and product
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markets.4 Anyway these remain largely open issues.
An issue that admittedly may disturb the measurement of scal shocks is raised by the way
purchases of durable goods are recorded in NIPAs. NIPAs mostly record such purchases on
a cash disbursements basis (see BEA (2005)) while the full amount of the acquisition (known
by the supplier from the moment the contract is signed) is likely to be the relevant fact from
the private sectors viewpoint. Thus National Accounts will typically record an initial payment
which does not reect the full size of the «true» shock. Still, an important part of purchases of
goods and services is not a¤ected by the issue.
3 Methodology
3.1 The equations and identifying restrictions
The results presented in this paper are based on the following system:
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4Although if interest rates moved as a response to scal news this would have consequences for real activity
(see, for instance, the formalization in Blanchard (1984)).
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Purchases of goods and services (including of capital goods) are denoted by gt, taxes net of
transfers by ntt, the federal funds rate by fft, detrended GDP (i.e. the output gap) by yt and
ination by pt. The vector xt includes the variables in the system: xt = [gt; ntt; fft; yt; pt]0. The
structural policy innovations (egt , e
nt
t and e
ff
t ) are ortogonal to each other and also to w
y
t and w
p
t ,
while these two innovations will be in general correlated. As usual in the SVAR methodology, the
identication restrictions are imposed on the contemporaneous coe¢ cients (the a0s), while the
lag structure of the model (the as) is left unrestricted. I assume that either bg;nt0 = 0 or b
nt;g
0 = 0.
I did not include deterministic terms in the equations; the discussion of the assumptions about
the low-frequency properties of series is given in a subsection below.
The system was estimated with quarterly data, which were seasonally adjusted (except for
the funds rate) at source. The lag length was set to 4. The scal variables and output are the
logarithms of the levels measured in real and per capita terms. Ination is calculated from the
GDP deator and, like the federal funds rate, is measured at annual rates. I give more details
about the denition of the scal variables and sources in Appendix B. Throughout the paper, ntt
is also sometimes called simply «taxes» , and gt «expenditure» or «spending» . The reference
sample is 1955:1-2005:4. Since I want to explore the changes in the behavior and e¤ects of
policies over time, I generally present results for two subsamples, splitting the main sample into
two parts: 1955:1-1979:4 and 1980:1-2005:4. The counterfactual exercises are carried out on the
basis of rolling subsamples, spanning as well over 25 years, so that the recessions approximately
coincide with the middle of them.
The rst two equations above are those for government expenditure and net taxes.5 If one
assumes, following Blanchard and Perotti (2002), that any government reaction to macroeco-
nomic conditions takes more than one quarter to be implemented, the a0s in (1) and (2) can
be interpreted as the automatic contemporaneous response of the scal variables to macroeco-
nomic conditions. Such a response may be brought about, in particular, by mechanisms built
5To consider each side of the budget separately, rather than the decit, allows us to investigate potential
di¤erentiated behavior and impacts. The denition of revenue as taxes net of transfers is in line with their impact
operating through the standard aggregate demand channel. Such denition has also the practical advantage of
lumping together in the revenue variable the budget categories that respond automatically to the business cycle.
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in the tax code, transfer programs and budgeting procedures. Since the scal variables are in
real terms, deated by the GDP deator, this also induces a contemporaneous co-movement of
gt and ntt with pt (these points are detailed in the discussion of the calibration of the para-
meters). The parameters ant;y0 and a
nt;p
0 will capture the automatic responses of net taxes to
activity and prices within the quarter, and ag;p0 of government spending to prices. It appears
relatively undisputable that spending does not react to contemporaneous movements in activity,
and therefore current GDP is absent from equation (1). Turning to the semi-elasticity of taxes
to the short-term interest rate, can ant;ff0 be set to zero? I argue it cannot. This point deserves
special attention since it lies at the very heart of the joint identication of monetary and scal
policy, and has hardly been dealt with by the literature. It is therefore addressed separately
below. As to the corresponding parameter in the expenditure equation, ag;ff0 , one expects it
to be indeed equal to zero, since there is no obvious mechanism linking purchases of goods and
services and interest rates within the quarter. However, once ant;ff0 6= 0, the estimation of ag;ff0
comes at no additional cost. Hence I estimate this coe¢ cient rather than impose a zero restric-
tion, in order to have exact identication (see Section 3.5). Note further that I allow either the
structural innovation to net taxes to enter the equation for gt, or the structural innovation to
expenditure to enter the equation for ntt (borrowing from Blanchard and Perotti). It makes
sense to do so because when setting scal policy, government takes into consideration both sides
of the budget. Identication of the respective parameters (bg;nt0 and b
nt;g
0 ) requires that one of
them is set to zero or, equivalently, that net taxes and spending are ordered one after the other.
Given that such an identication restriction is arbitrary, the results have to be checked under
both possibilities.
The coe¢ cients in ag and ant will reect any systematic response of government to macro-
economic developments - the scal policy rule, the lagged automatic reaction to the economy,
and the persistence in budget variables brought about by the way scal policy is set (since the
government budget and tax laws are not designed from scratch each year).6 Non-systematic
6Here it is interesting to draw a parallel with monetary policy rules based on interest rate targeting, in which
the Federal Reserve is, in principle, freer to set the interest rate at a given level. Nevertheless, the literature has
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policy is captured by the structural scal shocks (egt and e
nt
t ) whose e¤ects one endeavours to
trace using the SVAR methodology.
Equations (1) and (2) are supposed to capture scal policy rules. Literature on this issue
for the US such as Bohn (1998) and, more recently, Favero and Giavazzi (2007) argued that
scal authorities have acted according to a government debt stabilization motive besides an
output stabilization one. I did not take debt on board in the system, nevertheless. The reason is
that the scal actions to cope with growing debt or protracted decits approximately qualify as
exogenous, for they are unrelated to current economic developments. It is, thus, acceptable that
they are part of the shocks that will be used to measure the macroeconomic impact of scal policy.
Note that such debt stabilization motive can be distinguished from the short-term interaction
between the sides of the budget, say, when taxes are raised simultaneously with measures that
increase spending. In this case there may be endogeneity, and the current and lagged values of
net taxes and expenditure in equations (1) and (2) ensure that the estimated shocks will not
be «polluted» by it. Note that the evidence as to whether debt enters signicantly the scal
equations is anyway weak. Estimating the reduced-form of the system with lags of the variables
in xt and the lagged debt to GDP ratio (lags 1 to 4 in turn), the latter regressor was not
signicant at standard levels in the spending and net tax equations (though the coe¢ cient signs
were the expected ones, that is, negative and positive respectively). My reading of these results
is that scal variables may have responded to government debt mostly in an nonlinear fashion:
for example, corrective action was triggered only upon the cumulative imbalance reaching a
certain threshold (as in the period of sharp growth in the government debt to GDP ratio, from
1982 to 1995).
Equation (3) is the monetary policy rule and builds on well known literature showing that
(i) the federal funds rate provides a good measure of the monetary policy instrument, and (ii)
the rule can be modelled as the federal funds rate responding to output gap and to the deviation
assumed that the Fed smooths the changes in interest rates, implying that the rule includes lags of the policy
variable (see, for instance, Clarida et al. (2000)). In the case of scal policy there are even more reasons to follow
such a specication.
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of ination from a target (see e.g. Bernanke and Blinder (1992), Taylor (1993) and Christiano
et al. (1999)). In this context it is common to assume that monetary authorities observe the
developments in activity and ination and react accordingly within the quarter, whereas GDP
and ination are slow-moving variables that respond with a certain delay to changes in the
interest rates. I follow this assumption.7 A systematic response of monetary authorities to
contemporaneous scal developments is ruled out, that is, the current values of government
budget variables do not enter the monetary policy rule. As it is well known, monetary policy
VARs usually include a commodity price indicator in order to eliminate the so-called «price
puzzle» . I do not follow this practice because, on the one hand, the issue matters essentially
for the impact on ination, while the focus here is a narrow one, on activity. Moreover, since
estimation is based on short time periods, it is important to keep the system as small as possible.
Consider, nally, equations (4) and (5). I do not identify non-policy innovations, and these
equations may be seen as solved-out versions for output and prices of the IS and aggregate
supply relationships. Since current scal variables enter the former relationship, they will enter
both equations as well. Moreover, the disturbances wyt and w
p
t will be correlated, and a function
of the underlying structural private aggregate spending and aggregate supply innovations.8
3.2 The semi-elasticity of net taxes to the short-term rate
I address rst a preliminary issue concerning the denition of net taxes which has a direct
implication for the way this variable responds to the interest rate. Net taxes are equal to taxes
minus transfers and the latter can be computed either including or excluding interest paid (there
are examples of both treatments in the literature). The rst denition implicitly assumes that
the scal structural shocks originate in the full budget, and the second one that they originate in
7To check the pratical implications of this assumption, I experimented with fft ordered before yt and pt as
well. Switching the ordering does not matter much for the estimated parameters in the scal equations, nor
for the e¤ects of scal innovations on output over time. It matters for the e¤ects of monetary policy shocks
on GDP, in particular, in the initial quarters (this point is analysed in Christiano et al. (1999)). One gets the
counter-intuitive result that a tightening in monetary policy causes a positive initial reaction on GDP.
8Let the contemporaneous part of the IS curve be given by yt = fiscal variables + pt + "dt and aggregate
supply by yt = pt + "st . The respective structural innovations are "
d
t and "
s
t . Equation (4) obtains solving out
this system for yt and (5) solving it out for pt.
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the primary budget. I argue that the latter is the appropriate denition. SVARs are supposed
to identify and trace the e¤ects of discretionary non-systematic scal policy. However, the direct
determinants of interest outlays are the interest rates and the stock of debt and not (except in
very particular cases) discretionary scal policy actions. In other words, the structural scal
innovations do not enter an equation (actually, rather an identity) explaining government interest
outlays. From the point of view of empirical work, sticking to the primary budget implies that
the econometrician has to deal with only one channel through which the unexpected movements
in interest rates may impact movements in net taxes - the tax base - ruling out an additional
impact via the interest bill. Thus the precise issue is whether ant;ff0 can be set to zero, when
net taxes are dened without considering interest paid, as in this paper.
The correlation between the residuals of the reduced-form equations for net taxes and the
funds rate is around 0.19 and 0.42, respectively, in the rst and second subsamples. It is thus
reasonably high. Naturally that correlation is partly caused by a common response of the two
variables to the business cycle, in the rst case reecting the action of the automatic stabilizers,
in the second one due to the action of the Federal Reserve (and a similar argument applies
to ination). Nevertheless, the preliminary evidence is clearly against setting ant;ff0 to zero.
Note also that the opposite causality - a contemporaneous response of monetary policy to scal
variables - seems less plausible and should imply an important correlation between the reduced-
form residuals of federal funds and expenditure equations. The latter is however negligible (0.04
and -0.03 in the rst and second subsamples).
3.3 Assumptions regarding the low-frequency properties of the data
Although the analysis in this paper is conned to the short-term e¤ects of policies and does
not rely on long-run identication restrictions, the sample spans over 50 years and, hence, some
discussion of the assumptions about the low-frequency properties of the data is in order. There
is no point in entering here the debate about unit root behavior versus stationarity around a
deterministic linear trend of GDP for the US. In addition, both hypotheses might not be fully
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Figure 1: Macroeconomic variables, 1955:1-2005:4, and NBER recession dates
adequate as they do not accommodate the observed decline in the long-run GDP growth over
the last decades (as noted by Blanchard (1989)). Note that the evolution of the scal variables
throughout the sample (Figure 1) is also well characterized by a decreasing long-run growth rate.
Therefore, I formalize the trends in GDP and budget variables as deterministic, but allow for a
quadratic term in order to capture the change in average growth over time. This specication
was used in Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and is also one of the measures of the output gap
considered by Clarida et al. (2000) in the estimation of a monetary policy rule for the US. As
the system also includes an interest rate and ination for which it does not make sense to assume
a trending behavior, the deterministic trends in GDP and scal variables are removed by OLS
regression prior to estimation of the system.
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If the time-series properties of GDP are controversial, those of the short-term interest rate
and ination are hardly less. Stationarity of both series follows from a great deal of theoreti-
cal models that rationalize the use of monetary policy rules. Visual inspection of the respective
charts in Figure 1, however, indicates a long-run path di¢ cult to square with stationarity around
a single long-run mean - a driftless random walk appearing more appropriate. However, alter-
native stationary characterizations would be equally plausible, such as around a long-run mean
with an upward shift in the period from mid-seventies to mid-eighties. This assumption could
be rationalized as a temporary increase in expected ination implicit in the monetary policy
rule, brought about by the inationary process in the seventies. Nevertheless, as it would have
some degree of arbitrariness - in particular, as to the moment of the upward shift in the mean -
a conventional specication was chosen, including only a constant.
3.4 Calibration of elasticities of the government budget items
Before one looks into the identication and estimation of the system, it is appropriate to consider
the possibility of calibrating some of the parameters in the net tax and expenditure equations
on the basis of institutional information, following Blanchard and Perotti (2002). They relied
on the framework developed by the OECD (Giorno et al. (1995), updated in van den Noord
(2000) and Girouard and André (2005)) to compute the elasticity of personal income taxes
to GDP. In Appendix A, I extend this by deriving analytical expressions for the elasticity of
personal income taxes to prices and the semi-elasticity to the short-term interest rate. As
discussed there, however, this latter parameter cannot be calibrated on the basis of the data
made available by the OECD and remaining assumptions. I give in the appendix, in addition,
the details underlying the calculation of the elasticities of the remaining taxes and transfers to
activity and prices. Summing up, one is able to obtain ant;y0 , a
nt;p
0 and a
g;p
0 from non-sample
information, but not ant;ff0 which has to be estimated along with the other elements of the
matrix of the contemporaneous coe¢ cients.
Note that Perotti (2004) studied the e¤ects of scal policy in a system with the interest rate
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and prices, but imposing a zero semi-elasticity of net taxes to the sort-term interest rate (and
also using assumptions di¤erent from the ones here in order to derive the responses to prices).
This simplies the identication task but, as seen, is not adequate in the US context (Perottis
study deals with the US in the framework of a group of OECD countries).9
3.5 Identication and estimation
It is useful to write down the matrices with the contemporaneous structural coe¢ cients, denoted
by A0 and B0:
A0=
266666666664
1 0  ag;ff0 0  (ag;p0 )
0 1  ant;ff0  (ant;y0 )  (ant;p0 )
0 0 1  aff;y0  aff;p0
 ay;g0  ay;nt0 0 1 0
 ap;g0  ap;nt0 0 0 1
377777777775
B0=
266666666664
1 bg;nt0 0 0 0
bnt;g0 1 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 1
377777777775
, (6)
in which the calibrated parameters are in parentheses and, I recall, it is assumed that either
bnt;g0 = 0 or b
g;nt
0 = 0.
I estimated rst the reduced-form system. There are 15 independent moments in the reduced-
form covariance matrix and, excluding the information needed to obtain the 5 variances of the
disturbances plus the covariance between wyt and w
p
t , one is left with 9 usable moments. Given
the restrictions I impose on the contemporaneous coe¢ cients and as I am able to compute
ant;y0 , a
nt;p
0 and a
g;p
0 on the basis of non-sample information, there are 9 parameters to estimate.
Therefore, the order condition is satised for exact identication. Contrary to Blanchard and
Perotti (2002), the system cannot be estimated by instrumental variables (this would be, for
instance, possible if the federal funds rate was predetermined with respect to all the other
9Canzoneri et al. (2002) also consider a system with the federal funds rate and prices, but concentrated on
modelling the impact of the short-term rate on government interest outlays. The denition of variables adopted
here rules out this sort of co-movement, as already explained.
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variables). I estimated the decomposition by maximum likelihood, but note that the case at
hand di¤ers slightly from standard structural decompositions in that the covariance matrix of
the system 1 to 5 is not diagonal (as the covariance between wyt and w
p
t is nonzero).
10 Also note
that the information about the calibrated parameters is incorporated into A0 and B0 as average
values over the subsamples.
4 The destabilizing role of exogenous policies
Variance decompositions are the natural starting point for assessing the e¤ect of exogenous policy
disturbances on the volatility of output. Table 1 shows the breakdown of the variance of the
n-quarter ahead forecast error for output into the proportion accounted for by each of the three
identied policy disturbances, and the macroeconomic disturbances as a whole.11 I present the
point estimates and one-standard error bands in brackets computed on the basis of Monte Carlo
simulations12, separately for the subsamples 1955:1-1979:4 and 1980:1-2005:4. As memo items
are shown the point estimate for the long-run error variance, and the respective decomposition
in absolute terms. This quantity is of interest because it theoretically matches the unconditional
variance (whose estimate is also shown), helping explain the change between periods. The gures
for the two statistics di¤er in practice since, for example, they are small-sample estimates and
the rst one assumes an autoregressive representation that does not exactly hold. Nevertheless,
the unconditional variance of output is well approximated, and the procedure is informative
10This feature complicates the maximization process: as a strategy I took as initial values for the parameters
in A0 and B0 the estimates obtained when a diagonal covariance matrix is imposed (i.e. corresponding to an
overidentied system). Then, I reestimated allowing a non-diagonal covariance matrix and searching over a grid
of initial values for the variances. The nal results were very close both to the ones in the overidentication case
and also to the ones where exact identication is obtained in a standard way, by imposing an arbitrary ordering
between prices and output (i.e. if eiher prices entered equation (4) or output entered equation (5)).
11The latter is equal to the contribution associated with the variances and covariance of the disturbances in
output and price equations. As it turns out, the role of the covariance term is very small in the case of GDP. It
represents around 1 to 2 percent of the total long-run forecast error variance in both subsamples.
12The simulations were computed as follows. The OLS estimates of the reduced-form coe¢ cients and covariance
matrix were used to draw for the vector of coe¢ cients (assuming normality). The covariance matrix and its
structural factorization, obtained as described in Section 3.5, remain unchanged throughout. I found that a
sizeable proportion of the replications (for instance, almost one half in the rst sample) implied non-stationary
systems, for which the long-run forecast error is not nite. I disregarded them. The one-standard error bands are
computed as the percentiles 0.16 and 0.84 of the simulated distribution on the basis of 1000 draws.
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about how it was accounted for by the source disturbances in each of the subsamples considered.
Table 1: Variance decomposition for output
Sample 1955-1979 Sample 1980-2005
Proportion Policy sh. Macroec. Policy sh. Macroec.
due to eg ent eff sh. eg ent eff sh.
1Q ahead 12.5 10.0 0.3 77.2 4.1 0.5 0.2 95.2
4Q ahead 12.4 16.0 2.2 69.4 2.5 1.6 2.5 93.4
(7.5,18.8) (9.2,21.9) (0.6,6.7) (59.7,75.7) (1.0,5.6) (0.5,4.8) (1.0,6.2) (85.4,95.1)
12Q ahead 21.1 19.5 8.7 50.6 5.7 2.9 1.9 89.6
(10.0,30.8) (7.5,27.6) (2.8,26.5) (35.5,60.8) (1.8,14.0) (1.4,12.4) (1.4,7.1) (71.0,90.9)
Long-run 23.9 19.9 7.2 49.0 5.7 4.2 3.8 86.3
(9.7,32.7) (6.1,26.2) (4.8,28.5) (33.2,60.6) (5.4,25.2) (3.2,17.7) (2.5,10.3) (54.9,81.6)
Memo:
uncd. var. 13.3 4.7
long-run FEV 13.0 3.4
decomp. 3.1 2.6 0.9 6.4 0.2 0.1 0.1 3.0
shock var. 1.7 5.1 0.3 0.9 4.9 0.5
Notes: Rows 1st to 4th: percentage of the forecast error variance for GDP accounted for by structural policy disturbances
(government spending, net taxes and funds rate) and macroeconomic disturbances, point estimates with one-standard
error bands in parenthesis. Rows 5th: unconditional variance of output. Row 6th and 7th: long-run forecast error variance
and absolute decomposition by disturbance (point estimates only). Row 8th: standard error of policy shocks.
According to the point estimates, in the rst half of the sample policy shocks jointly ac-
counted for slightly more than half of long-run movements in output gap, not far from the
corresponding gure of 44 per cent presented in Blanchard and Watson (1984) (using a sample
from 47:1 to 82:4). In the period 1980-2005, in contrast, only around 15 percent of long-run
GDP variance is attributable to them. Such point estimates in the second half of the sample
are however close to the lower limit of the condence for the policy disturbances and beyond
the upper limit for the macroeconomic ones. Hence, this appears to overstate somewhat the
loss of importance of the policy disturbances over time. If one takes instead the average of the
simulated distributions (not shown), the share of long-run variance becomes about 1/3 and 2/3
for policy and non-policy disturbances, respectively, in the post-1980 period, against 1/2 for
each group in the pre-1980 years. These gures still support a reduction in the relative role of
exogenous policies as a source of output volatility in recent decades.
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As said, the point estimate of the long-term forecast error variance mimics well the uncon-
ditional variance of output, including its well known decline in recent decades (note that the
2008-09 recession is beyond my sample period). That indicator goes down from 13.3 in the
period 1955:1-1979:4 to 4.7 in 1980:1-2005:4, the phenomenon known as the great moderation.13
Looking at the decomposition of the long-run variance in absolute terms, there is a general-
ized fall of the contribution across all disturbances in the post-1980 years. Such movement was
sharper in the case of policy shocks leading to their mentioned loss of importance vis-a-vis their
macroeconomic counterparts. On balance, evidence in Table 1 thus indicates that more than
half of the decline in output volatility can ultimately be ascribed to the e¤ect of exogenous
policies.
In order to explore this result further, note that the contribution to a variables variance of
primary shocks depends both on the own variance and the impact on that variable (i.e. shock
propagation). Over the two subsamples, the variance of policy shocks (last line in Table 1)
remained broadly stable for net taxes, went down by about 50 percent for spending and up by a
similar percentage for the federal funds rate. It is worth noting that the results I get for this last
variable hinge on the inclusion of the early eighties in the second subsample, corresponding to
the Volcker desination period, characterized by high volatility of the instrument and estimated
shocks. In fact, when the second subsample is restricted to 1982:4-2005:5, the variance of
monetary policy the disturbances I get is around 0.1, implying a fall of 60 percent in comparison
with the pre-1980 period. In general these gures indicate that improved exogenous monetary
and scal (as far as spending is concerned) policies played some role in the decline of output
variance.14 Nevertheless, the results also suggest a dampening of the e¤ect of policy shocks on
GDP not only in the case of net taxes but, given the magnitude of the decrease in the absolute
13Recall that the paper uses detrended log real and per capita output. Other studies though using alternative
volatility measures - for instance, dened on the basis of growth rates - and slightly di¤erent sample periods
present reductions in the range from 40 to 50 percent in terms of standard deviation (see Ahmed et al. (2004))
which are similar to the one I get.
14 In what concerns government expenditure shocks, one may conjecture that the smaller deviation of pay
updates from average ination in the more recent period (see Section 2) contributed importantly for that reduced
volatility.
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Figure 2: Impact of policy shocks on ouput
contributions documented in Table 1, also in the case of the federal funds rate and spending.
Figure 2 depicts the e¤ects of policy shocks of the same size in both subsamples (equal to
the standard error in the rst one) on output: point estimates and one-standard error condence
bands computed using the same methodology as for the variance decompositions. The charts
show a marked subsample sensitivity with respect to the impact of exogenous scal policy on
real activity. In the pre-1980 period the evidence is consistent with the Keynesian prior.15 That
15 It can also be reconciled with neoclassical models, since a distinction between macro theories could only be
made by considering the e¤ects on output components. This is not the objective of the study. Note, however,
that the denition of scal variables on the revenue side is more suited for investigating the e¤ects of scal policy
in a Keynesian framework.
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impact becomes much smaller in the recent decades for expenditure, while for net taxes there is
even a perverse e¤ect on output.
The impact multiplier of spending shocks on output in the rst subsample is signicant
and stands at 1.3. It builds up subsequently to a peak multiplier around 2.0 reached around
the third quarter. In the post-1980 years, in contrast, the corresponding peak impact gure is
1.0 only and the response stands overall on the brink of non-signicance. Structural net tax
innovations trigger a fall of output before 1980, the multiplier being equal to -0.7 on impact and
-1.4 at trough (attained three quarters out). Note that the magnitude of the response depicted
in Figure 2 is nevertheless similar to that for spending shocks, because the size of net tax shocks
in currency is about twice larger. When the estimation period starts in 1980, the point estimate
changes to a positive very small e¤ect on output (maximum impact equal to 0.4), albeit barely
signicant.
Such break in the e¤ectiveness of exogenous scal policy is in line with the evidence presented
in Perotti (2004) (also as regards the reversion of the sign of the impact of net taxes in recent
decades) who considered two subsamples approximately coinciding with mine: 1960:1-1979:4
and 1980:1-2001:4. A well known earlier study, Blanchard and Perotti (2002), obtained relative
large Keynesian e¤ects on the two sides of the budget using data from 1960:1 to 1997:4. The
specication they follow has important di¤erences in comparison to the one followed here. For
instance, it does not control for the monetary policy variable (nor for prices) and this may
amplify the depressing e¤ects of net tax shocks.16 Nonetheless, the measured e¤ectiveness of
scal policy seems to depend more on the sample period than on the inclusion of the monetary
policy instrument in the system. In particular, Blanchard and Perottis sample does not comprise
the years between end-1990s and mid-2000s, and their inclusion contributes to the measured
decrease in scal policy e¤ectiveness. For example, when I take the full sample but ending in
1997 instead of 2005, the spending multiplier goes down from 1.9 to 1.3. More on the time
prole of policy e¤ectiveness is given in Section 6.
16 If the funds rate is omitted from net tax equation and that variable enters with a positive sign in this equation,
net tax shocks will respond positively to the funds rate.
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There is also a weakening of the impact of exogenous monetary policy in recent decades. In
the pre-1980 sample, the dynamics of GDP take more time to build up following monetary policy
shocks, by comparison with their scal counterparts. I compute an indicator of relative policy
e¤ectiveness (analogous to the scal multiplier). The maximum impact on output is attained
about seven quarters out and stands at about 0.7 percent per p.p. of change in the funds rate.
In the second subsample, the prole of the response changes in that the peak impact is reached
quicker. The relative e¤ectiveness goes down to less than half of the gure for the years prior
to 1980. Such ndings are consistent with those presented elsewhere (for instance, Bovin and
Giannoni (2006))
Di¤erent explanations have been put forward for the lost of inuence of exogenous policies
on output which, for the purposes of this paper, is useful to divide into two groups. The rst one
includes explanations coming from the behavior of the private sector, say, nancial innovation
may have allowed households and rms to protect themselves better against uctuations in
interest rates and budget aggregates. The second group includes explanations related to the
conduct of endogenous policies. For instance, it has been argued that the weakening of the
e¤ect of scal policy shocks stems from the more powerful stabilizing role of monetary policy
in recent decades. Such explanation has been put forward also to justify the smaller impact
of monetary policy shocks. Similarly, if automatic stabilizers had become more e¤ective in
the post-1980 period, this would mitigate the e¤ect of exogenous policies. In the subsequent
sections, some evidence bearing on this second type of explanations is presented and does not
favour it. The reaction of the federal funds rate following budget shocks (Section 5.3) is not
consistent with a stronger dampening impact in the second subsample. At the same time, the
counterfactual simulations carried out in the last part of the paper point to a smaller stabilizing
e¤ect of scal policy (the results for monetary policy being not informative).
In comparison to previous work dealing with the great moderation, the ndings here pre-
sented are novel in one respect - the role of exogenous scal policy in the moderation of GDP
uctuations. This possibility has been generally overlooked as studies centered on monetary side
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as far as policy explanations for the phenomenon were concerned.17 Actually part of what these
studies assigned to good luck may be accounted for by scal shocks (whose e¤ect is captured by
the general demand shock in case of omission).
5 Some aspects about the behavior of monetary and scal poli-
cies
5.1 Responsiveness to the economy
This section deals with aspects concerning the behavior of monetary and scal policy that can
be inferred still using standard VAR tools. The rst one is the responsiveness of endogenous
policies to economic developments. One way to assess this is by looking at the joint contribution
of macroeconomic disturbances to the variance of the error in forecasting the policy variables.
This is shown in Table 2. In order to compare the gures, before and after 1980, I present as
previously the long-run forecast error and absolute contributions, as well as the unconditional
variance. Given that, as said, the behavior of the funds rate was markedly di¤erent at the
beginning of the eighties in comparison to subsequently, I also present the estimates excluding
the period 1982:4-2005:4 in square brackets.
Subsample sensitivity questions apart, there is a clear di¤erence between the role of non-
policy disturbances for the uctuations in net taxes and spending. They explain about 1/2 of
the long-run variation in the rst case, but only around 1/4 in the second (this latter gure is
much smaller in the point estimate which is however close to the lower limit of the condence
band). A great deal of movements in net taxes are thus endogenous reecting the reaction of
both automatic and discretionary policies to output. While our methodology does not allow to
distinguish between them, analyses typically indicate a much more important role of automatic
17An exception in this regard is Stock and Watson (2002) who in one of their exercises considered the role of
scal shocks but concluded that they had played a negligible role. The approach they follow di¤ers from the one
here in that they take directly the structural shocks, say, monetary, scal, and so on from di¤erent studies. These
shocks are not ortogonal by construction and cannot be used to decompose the variance of output as I do here.
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responses, and the di¤erence vis-a-vis the behavior of spending is consistent with this conclu-
sion. In fact, own innovations to government expenditure are the most important source for
the respective variance decomposition. Most movements in it pursued policy goals that cannot
be traced back - and hence are exogenous - to macroeconomic conditions. Among these goals
feature, as alluded to in Section 2, national security, expenditure restraint and wage compara-
bility with the private sector. Finally, the important endogenous content of the monetary policy
instrument reects the conduct of stabilization actions by the Federal Reserve.
Table 2: Variance of policy variables accounted for by macroeconomic shocks
Sample 1955-1979 Sample 1980-2005
Proportion Exp. Net taxes Fed. funds Exp. Net taxes Fed. funds
1Q ahead 3.3 47.9 3.7 3.8 27.5 15.0 [11.8]
4Q ahead 5.9 70.3 39.8 4.7 53.7 73.6 [49.4]
(3.6,12.5) (62.0,74.6) (30.3,47.9) (3.2,10.4) (44.5,60.4) (66.9,76.2)
12Q ahead 16.8 52.1 56.2 8.2 60.3 84.1 [53.8]
(10.7,30.7) (39.5,60.3) (38.2,64.9) (5.1,22.4) (43.0,67.8) (67.5,84.7)
Long-run 27.7 54.9 61.6 12.2 47.8 78.3 [39.0]
(18.6,47.0) (37.9,61.6) (35.6,64.8) (10.4,37.9) (30.2,58.7) (43.4,76.8)
Memo:
uncd. var. 23.4 60.9 7.2 27.7 97.1 14.0 [6.2]
long-run FEV 27.5 79.8 12.8 34.1 88.1 7.9 [4.7]
macroec. sh. 7.6 43.8 7.9 3.9 42.1 6.1 [1.8]
var. wyt 1.2 0.3 [0.2]
var. wpt 0.9 0.5 [0.4]
Notes: Rows 1st to 4th: percentage of the forecast error variance for policy variables accounted for by macroeconomic
disturbances, point estimates with one-standard error bands in parenthesis. Rows 5th: unconditional variance of expen-
diture, net taxes and the federal funds rate. Row 6th and 7th: long-run forecast error variance and absolute contribution
(point estimates only). Rows 8th and 9th: variance of each macroeconomic disturbance. In square brackets are gures
computed restricting the second subsample to the period 1982:4-2005:4.
The proportion of the long-run variance of net taxes accounted for by the non-policy shocks
remained broadly stable between the pre- and post-1980 periods. This also holds for the con-
tribution measured in absolute terms. Note that there was a large rise of the unconditional
variance which the statistic computed on the basis of the long-run forecast error does not fully
replicate. In any case, the variance of the macroeconomic disturbances went down considerably
between the two periods, as shown in the Table, particularly that of GDP which accounts for
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the bulk of the long run net tax uctuations.18 Hence, an increase in responsiveness has most
likely occurred. The question arises whether this is accounted for by automatic or discretionary
responses. Auerbach (2002) studied the sensitivity of economic stabilizers to the business cycle
concluded that it has uctuated over time but without a dened trend, being roughly stable
on average from one subsample to the other. The results I get are thus likely to be accounted
for by discretionary responses, and match the evidence in Taylor (2000). This may be seen as
surprising since legislated tax changes responding to cyclical developments were approximately
conned to the period covered by the rst subsample (see, for instance, Romer and Romer
(2009b)). Bush II tax cuts build possibly the only exception of a measure whose motivation
was partly anti-recessionary in the post-1980 period until the end of my sample. Several factors
may nevertheless contribute to an apparent increase in the anti-cyclical nature of discretionary
policy. Firstly, poor timing of countercyclical policy may blur the estimation of its pattern in
the rst subsample. For instance, the 1975 tax rebate and other measures enacted by the Nixon
administration were felt mostly in the second quarter of the year, that is, one quarter after the
trough of the recession. Secondly, in some occasions after 1979 policy was countercyclical by
coincidence: Reagan tax cuts, albeit not aiming at stimulating demand, were implemented in
the course of the 1981-82 recession. Thirdly, the growth of revenue in the nineties was quicker
than justied by the boom, since the incomes of people in higher tax brackets rose particularly
fast. This may be captured in the estimation as a countercyclical response.
I now turn to the responsiveness of the federal funds rate to economic conditions. This
issue has been intensively debated and a number of studies (see, for instance, Bovin (2006) and
Primiceri (2005) and references therein) have found that the reaction of monetary authorities to
the economy gained strength in recent decades, although this conclusion is not fully consensual.
Unfortunately the unconditional variance of the funds rate is poorly approximated in both
subsamples by the procedure I have been using. In the second subsample, this is perhaps due to
18This quantity depends also on the change in the covariance between the two macroeconomic disturbances, as
they are not ortogonal. Like for GDP, however, for net taxes the contribution of the covariance term is rather
small.
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the much higher volatility of the series in the early eighties (total variance decreases from 14.0
to 6.2 when the period 1980:1-1983:3 is excluded from the sample), which is not captured in the
estimation with constant coe¢ cients throughout the subsample as a whole. The approximation
improves when the post-1983:3 sample is taken. Comparing these latter gures with the ones
for the period prior to 1980, the contribution of macroeconomic disturbances went down both
in relative and absolute terms. However, given the overestimation of the unconditional variance
by the long-run forecast error in the rst subsample, the fall in macroeconomic shocksvolatility
and the uncertainty about precise magnitudes, it is di¢ cult to draw conclusions in this case.
5.2 The feedback between net taxes and spending
A question of interest in this context is the mutual response between the two sides of the budget.
Figures in Table 3 indicate that expenditure shocks account for a sizeable proportion of the long-
run movement in net taxes, about 1/5 in the rst subsample and 1/4 in the second - though
the condence bands are wide. In contrast, innovations to net taxes explain a small amount of
the forecast error variance for spending in both subsamples whatever the horizon taken (this is
particularly pronounced if the point estimates are taken, but also the average of the simulated
distribution also indicates a share of only 10 percent).
Table 3: Variance of scal variables accounted for by scal shocks
Sample 1955-1979 Sample 1980-2005
Proportion Expenditure Net taxes Expenditure Net taxes
due to eg ent eg ent eg ent eg ent
1Q ahead 96.6 0.0 10.1 41.2 94.8 0.0 0.3 66.0
4Q ahead 90.8 0.8 10.0 11.1 90.3 0.2 1.3 42.7
(80.6,91.7) (0.3,3.5) (6.0,15.4) (9.3,14.3) (81.7,92.3) (0.2,2.5) (0.5,4.3) (33.9,49.7)
12Q ahead 77.8 2.5 23.4 8.5 87.9 0.4 5.9 32.4
(54.2,77.8) (0.9,9.7) (12.9,31.4) (5.9,14.0) (69.5,88.0) (0.5,6.7) (1.6,17.6) (19.7,44.0)
Long-run 60.2 5.2 21.1 9.5 84.4 2.4 25.6 23.3
(26.0,61.4) (2.7,17.2) (10.4,29.9) (5.5,17.1) (46.5,79.2) (1.8,17.4) (9.4,41.7) (12.9,35.0)
Notes: Percentage of the forecast error variance for expenditure and net taxes accounted for by structural scal distur-
bances, point estimates with one-standard error bands in parenthesis.
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In order to complement this evidence, it is useful to look at the impact of shocks to each
scal variable on the opposite side of the budget (Figure 3). Net tax shocks have essentially no
impact irrespective of the sample period. On the contrary, spending shocks trigger a signicant
e¤ect in the two subsamples, but the respective sign changes from positive in the pre-1980
data to negative in the subsequent period. The magnitudes of these e¤ects are similar and
thus nearly cancel out in the full-sample responses (not shown), and the same occurs for the
variance decomposition of spending. The maximum impact stands at about 1.3 percent in the
rst subsample and -1.0 percent in the second one. The gure for the period before 1980 matches
the initial shock, which has a size of 1.3 percent as well, given that the levels of the two scal
variables are close. The results thus capture a short-term budget-balancing movement in the
pre-1980 period, but not subsequently.
These results are robust to a reversal of the ordering, i.e. to placing expenditure after taxes.
When this is the case, impulse-responses hardly move in comparison to Figure 3. Similarly, net
tax innovations continue to be unimportant for spending uctuations and spending innovations
to account for a sizeable part of net tax unconditional variance (almost 25 percent in each of
the subsamples). What conclusions can be drawn from this? Firstly, given that the results
hold under both possible orderings, there is evidence of causality going from spending to taxes
and not the other way around. Secondly, the mechanism underlying the respective relationship
changed from one subsample to the other. Political economy o¤ers multiple explanations for
casual links between the sides of the budget, going in both directions. The results in the rst
subsample indicate a tendency for changes in expenditure to lead changes in taxes. They are
consistent with the main ndings of older studies such as von Furstenberg et al. (1986), whose
sample period roughly corresponds to my rst subsample, and may reect the way important
spending programs (e.g. the interstate highway system) were nanced during the fties and
sixties.
The results for the post-1980 years, causality apart, imply a negative correlation between
the budget variables. This was a period of larger and long-lasting budget imbalances of both
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Figure 3: Responses of scal variables to scal shocks
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signs, as depicted in Figure 1, characterized by debt stabilization policies (during the Clinton
years and before) and «spending the surplus» policies (during the Bush II years). Both entail
changes in the two sides of the budget going in the opposite direction in the short-run.19 More
di¢ cult to explain is the direction of the causality, running from spending to taxes; this may be
just chance causality given that we are looking at small samples.
A potential intertemporal link between the two sides of the budget that received attention
recently is the «starve the beast hypothesis» which predicts that tax cuts lead to spending
reductions. The results here are against this hypothesis for the US (consistently with Romer
and Romer (2009a)).
5.3 Interaction between scal and monetary policies
To start with I consider the reaction of the budget variables to monetary policy shocks. Net taxes
go up following a tightening in monetary policy20 (Figure 4), a result presumably brought about
by the reaction within the quarter of the tax base of the personal income tax to movements
in short-term rates. Christiano et al. (1996), working with ow of funds data, reported an
initial contraction of government borrowing following a tightening in monetary policy. The
same phenomenon is disclosed here. In the period before 1980, the response weakens quickly
and becomes negative after about 1 year as recession takes hold, in line with the depressing
e¤ect of the monetary shock on output. In the second subsample, there is simply a rapid decay
toward zero. The response of expenditure in the wake of a funds rate shock, albeit small and
on the brink of non-signicance, has a negative sign that is di¢ cult to interpret.
I now turn to the pattern displayed by the funds rate following government budget shocks
(Figure 5). The evidence for the rst subsample appears consistent with the operation of the
19Given that transfers are netted out against taxes in the denition of variables followed, my results cannot
capture a possible feedback beween revenue and mandatory outlays. Such a feedback could particularly originate
in the «pay-as-you-go» budget rules in place during the nineties, which required that changes in one of those be
matched by changes in the other.
20The contemporaneous semi-elasticity of net taxes to the federal funds rate is estimated at 0.6 and 1.0 p.p.,
respectively, in the pre- and post-1980 periods. This implies that a 1 p.p. increase in the funds rate leads to a
rise in net taxes from 0.5 to 1 percent, on impact.
29
Expenditure response Net tax response
Sample 1955:1-1979:4
quarters after shock
pe
rc
en
ta
ge
5 10 15 20
-4
-2
0
2
4
Sample 1980:1-2005:4
quarters after shock
pe
rc
en
ta
ge
5 10 15 20
-4
-2
0
2
4
Sample 1955:1-1979:4
quarters after shock
pe
rc
en
ta
ge
5 10 15 20
-4
-2
0
2
4
Sample 1980:1-2005:4
quarters after shock
pe
rc
en
ta
ge
5 10 15 20
-4
-2
0
2
4
Figure 4: Responses of scal variables to a monetary policy shock
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Figure 5: Response of the federal funds rate to scal shocks
policy rule, given that net tax and spending innovations work, respectively, as negative and
positive aggregate demand shocks (also as far as the responses of ination - not shown - are
concerned). In the post-1980 years the negative trajectory of the short-term rate following
spending shocks is - ruling out an accommodating behavior - di¢ cult to explain, as those shocks
are still expansionary (and the e¤ect on ination still positive) albeit much less e¤ective than in
the rst subsample. As far as net taxes are concerned, the initial rise in the funds rate may be
triggered by the perverse e¤ect on output, while subsequently the response to declining ination
takes hold. In any case, the evidence is clearly not consistent with the weakening of scal shocks
e¤ectiveness being explained by the behavior of monetary policy, for the kind of response I get
would magnify their e¤ects rather than mute them.
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6 The stabilizing role of endogenous policies during contrac-
tions: a counterfactual exercise
In this section, the identied VAR estimated previously is used to shed some light on the
e¤ects of endogenous monetary and scal policies during postwar business cycle contractions.
In order to do so, I carry out a counterfactual exercise in the spirit of Sims and Zha (1998) and
Bernanke et al. (1997). The basic idea behind it is to compare the historical behavior of the
variables of interest with the implied behavior when the system is simulated under counterfactual
assumptions, which here concern modications in the policy responses and paths of exogenous
policy shocks. I undertake this exercise for each of the eight business cycle contractions - as
given by the NBER dates - from 1955 to 2005. Analyses like the one carried out below have been
pursued by previous literature using di¤erent methodologies - a particularly well-known example
being Romer and Romer (1994), who nevertheless did not di¤erentiate between endogenous and
exogenous policies.
The detailed methodology of this counterfactual exercise is as follows. For each contraction
and each policy variable, I simulate the system (1) to (5) under two scenarios: (i) absence of
the exogenous component of policy and (ii) absence of the endogenous component of policy.
The simulation period starts at the rst quarter after the peak and ends at the quarter of the
trough. More precisely, taking gt as an example, exercise (i) is carried out with the parameters
in all equations at their estimated values and the shocks set to their estimated paths during the
simulation period, except for e^gt which is set to zero. Exercise (ii) shuts down any systematic
reaction of gt so that during the simulation period the variable in driven only by exogenous
shocks (i.e. the variable follows a random walk). This is done by setting all parameters in (1)
to zero, except for the rst lag of expenditure which is set to one. Otherwise the shocks to all
variables, including e^gt , are set to their estimated paths and the parameters in the remaining
equations are at their estimated values. As a rst step I split the actual change in the policy
variable into the exogenous and endogenous components. These obtain as the di¤erence between
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the actual level and the simulated level of the policy variable at trough in each of the exercises.
Similarly, the e¤ect on GDP is measured as the di¤erence between the actual level of output
gap and the level implied by the simulations.
Given the evidence of structural change presented above, the exercise is carried out on the
basis of 25-year rolling subsamples whose mid-points coincide roughly with the start of each
recession. For the recessions taking place close to the beginning and the end of the sample, I
take respectively the extreme subsamples 1955:1-1979:4 and 1980:1-2005:4 (the ones used in the
preceding sections).
It is well known that the implementation of such policy analyses in a VAR context is not
without caveats given the issues raised by the Lucas critique: one can argue that if endogenous
policy had been di¤erent from the historical path, agents could have reacted di¤erently. In de-
fense of this approach, one can put forward the argument of Sims and Zha that it may provide
acceptable results if the deviation of policy from its historical path is not too protracted. The
episodes considered lasted on average less than 4 quarters. Beyond that issue of a more theoret-
ical nature, another caveat to be made concerns the reliance on the identication assumptions.
6.1 Breaking down the change in policy variables into the endogenous and
exogenous components
Table 4 breaks down the actual peak-to-trough change in expenditure, net taxes and the federal
funds rate into the systematic and exogenous components. This is measured in percentage points
also in the case of the scal variables, as these are taken in terms of percent deviation from
trend. Note that the actual change in each policy variable is not exactly matched by the sum
of the two components, because the structural shock indirectly interacts with the endogenous
structure of the system after it has impacted the respective policy variable. The simulation
exercise by denition does not capture such an interaction, but the approximation generally
works well. There are however exceptions, for instance, the endogenous component of net taxes
is overestimated in the 1960-61 recession and, to a lesser extent, in the 1973-75 and 1981-82
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ones.
Table 4: Decomposition of changes in the policy variables during contractions
Expenditure Net taxes Fed. funds rate
Business (p.p., cumulative) (p.p., cumulative) (p.p., cumulative)
cycle actual cf. decomp. actual cf. decomp. actual cf. decomp.
contractions change exog. endog. change exog. endog. change exog. endog.
57:03-58:02 1.2 0.2 1.0 -16.0 -2.2 -12.0 -2.3 0.4 -2.9
60:02-61:01 2.9 1.3 1.5 -6.9 2.1 -16.1 -1.7 0.3 -2.0
69:04-70:04 -2.5 -1.8 -0.7 -15.8 0.8 -14.3 -3.4 -1.5 -1.7
73:04-75:01 1.8 3.1 -2.2 -18.4 2.3 -28.3 -3.7 -2.9 -1.4
80:01-80:03 -2.5 -2.6 0.5 -8.7 1.1 -9.4 -5.2 -1.2 -3.9
81:03-82:04 1.8 -0.9 3.7 -20.5 0.4 -27.4 -8.3 -1.0 -7.2
90:03-91:01 0.6 1.0 -0.6 -8.6 -1.6 -6.3 -1.7 0.0 -1.8
01:01-01:04 1.9 0.7 1.2 -12.6 -0.1 -9.5 -3.5 -1.4 -1.0
Notes: The dates indicate the peak and trough quarters. Actual change in the variable is measured as the variation peak-
to-trough. The components are equal to the di¤erence, at the trough, between the actual gure for the policy variable and
the simulated gure shutting down the exogenous or the endogenous response, respectively. The simulation period starts
in the rst quarter after the peak. The sample periods are: 1955:1-1979:4 - 1st and 2nd recessions, 1957:3-1982:2 -3rd,
1961:3-1986:2 - 4th, 1967:3-1992:2 - 5th, 1968:3-1993:2 - 6th, 1977:3-2002:2 - 7th and 1980:1-2005:4 - 8th.
Figures in Table 4 indicate a consistent pattern of anti-recessionary endogenous movements
in the federal funds rate and net taxes, in line with the evidence presented above about the
responsiveness of these variables to the economy. Nothing comparable happens for government
expenditure whose endogenous variation is not even uniformly countercyclical (i.e. positive). In
this case the exogenous component dominates, documenting the importance of own innovations
for spending uctuations.
The exogenous component of net taxes is relatively unimportant against the overall change.
It will capture, for instance, the impact of factors unrelated to the economy causing changes in
social transfers (e.g. aging populations): recessions coinciding with periods of particularly high
growth will tend to have smaller such components.21 Another factor that might be present in
the results - prior to 1980 - is «bracket creeping» . Personal income tax brackets used to remain
unchanged for some time, which happened in the years overlapping with all recessions during that
21Visual inspection of the chart with the growth rate of (real and per capita) transfers not related to unem-
ployment indicates that this may have been the case of the recessions at the beginning of the 1990s and 2000s.
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period (see Tax Foundation (2007)). This amounted to a tax increase even without legislation
passed, and may explain the sign and particularly large size of the exogenous component in the
1973-75 recession, given its length and high level of ination (although this phenomenon may
have been also partly captured as an endogenous response to ination).
The gures do not indicate a noticeable di¤erence in the relative importance of the endoge-
nous and exogenous components for the funds rate before and after 1980. In some recessions,
notably the 1973-75 one, an important part of the reduction in the funds rate was captured by
the exogenous component, that is, the actual loosening was larger than implied by the estimated
rule. This ts in with the reading of the Feds behavior during this episode in Romer and Romer
(1994), in that, the Fed recognized at an early stage the downturn in activity but hesitated to
take action (in what can be seen as acting according to the rule) due to concerns about ination.
However, in view of the unfavorable output developments, decided subsequently to cut the funds
rate more sharply.
Movements in government expenditure during contractions have been much smaller than
for the other variables: they averaged 1.5 standard deviations22 against almost 5 in the case
of the funds rate, and almost 6 in the case of net taxes. The most important spending item
is compensation of employes which reacts negatively to current ination (as calibrated above),
given that all variables are in real terms and, one would expect, on average positively to lagged
ination. This mechanism should reduce the endogenous component in periods of rising ination
and the opposite in times of declining ination, as it can be indeed observed for the recessions
of 1973-75 and 1981-82 which coincided with such periods. Note also that great deviations from
ination of pay updates of government employees, as it used to happen until the beginning of
the 80s, will be reected on the exogenous component.
22Considering only the positive (i.e. countercyclical) changes.
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6.2 Impact of endogenous policies on GDP
Table 5 shows the impact on GDP of the outlined pattern of endogenous changes in policy
variables during contractions. The stabilizing role is computed as the output loss avoided at
trough, i.e. the di¤erence between the actual level and the simulated level without the oper-
ation of endogenous policies. By comparing this gure and the actual contraction of output
(also shown), it is possible to have a measure of the relative dampening e¤ect at that point.
The counterfactual multiplier/relative e¤ectiveness gure intends to capture the e¤ectiveness of
endogenous policies, and is obtained as the relationship between the stabilizing impact and the
change in the policy variable. In parenthesis appear the indicators for the maximum impact of
exogenous policy, as computed in Section 4, taking the same rolling samples. These are shown in
order to give a rough indication about e¤ectiveness of endogenous vs exogenous policies (note,
however, that in the rst case e¤ectiveness is assessed at trough of the recession while, in the
second case, it is measured at the point where it is highest).
Table 5: Impact of scal and monetary policies on output
Business actual Impact of endogenous change in:
cycle output Expenditure Net taxes Fed. funds rate
contractions change cf. stabil. cf. mul- cf. stabil. cf. mul- cf. stabil. cf. relative
(p.p.) role (p.p.) tiplier role (p.p.) tiplier role (p.p.) e¤ectiv.
57:03-58:02 -6.6 0.3 1.9 (2.1) 6.1 -2.5 (-1.4) 0.3 -0.1 (-0.7)
60:02-61:01 -3.6 0.5 1.7 (2.1) 6.5 -2.0 (-1.4) 0.2 -0.1 (-0.7)
69:04-70:04 -3.6 -0.2 - (1.5) 7.2 -2.3 (-1.3) 0.8 -0.4 (-0.9)
73:04-75:01 -7.2 -0.3 - (1.1) 7.7 -1.4 (-1.1) 0.1 -0.1 (-0.7)
80:01-80:03 -3.8 0.1 1.7 (1.4) 0.7 -0.4 (-0.5) 0.2 -0.0 (-0.4)
81:03-82:04 -6.4 1.2 1.8 (1.6) 3.5 -0.7 (-0.5) 2.0 -0.3 (-0.4)
90:03-91:01 -2.9 -0.1 - (1.8) -0.4 0.3 (0.7) 0.0 -0.0 (-0.3)
01:01-01:04 -1.8 0.1 0.7 (1.0) -0.4 0.2 (0.3) 0.1 -0.1 (-0.3)
Notes: The dates indicate the peak and trough quarters. Actual change in output is measured as the variation peak-to-
trough. The stabilizing role is equal to the di¤erence at trough between the actual GDP level and the simulated level,
shutting down the endogenous response. The multiplier/relative e¤ectiveness indicator is the ratio between the output
loss avoided and the change in policy variable; in parenthesis is shown the maximum e¤ect of exogenous policy shocks on
GDP relative to the impulse. The simulation period starts in the rst quarter after the peak. The rolling sample periods
are: 1955:1-1979:4 - 1st and 2nd recessions, 1957:3-1982:2 -3rd, 1961:3-1986:2 - 4th, 1967:3-1992:2 - 5th, 1968:3-1993:2 -
6th, 1977:3-2002:2 - 7th and 1980:1-2005:4 - 8th.
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Taxes net of transfers played a key stabilizing role in the recessions during the sixties and
seventies. This resulted from the important countercyclical movements in the variable coupled
with its great e¤ectiveness to stimulate activity. In e¤ect, the multiplier of endogenous net taxes
is estimated in the range 2.0 to 2.5 (and above that of exogenous policy) in the course of that
period. The e¤ectiveness of endogenous net taxes has weakened over time and in the last two
recessions they had even small destabilizing role. Given that this variable is chiey associated
with automatic movements, it follows that not only discretionary but also automatic policy
seems to have lost capacity to stimulate activity. An important caveat about these conclusions
is that the last two recessions considered were particularly short and mild, and this may bias
the results toward nding smaller e¤ects of policy. In any case, there is way to check their
plausibility in broad terms. The bulk of long-run GDP variance explained by macroeconomic
disturbances is associated with the one in output equation (almost all in the rst subsample and
90 percent in the second one). As seen in table Table 2 (last two lines), there was a reduction of
about 80 percent of this disturbances variance. If the stabilizing role of scal policy was indeed
smaller in the second subsample, then one would expect that reduction not to be fully «passed-
on» to GDP volatility, that is a smaller decrease in the absolute contribution of macroeconomic
disturbances to output volatility. The gures in Table 1 indicate a fall of 50 percent, perhaps
a bit more, in this quantity. While these gures are surrounded by great uncertainty, they are
not inconsistent with the conclusions outlined.
The gures imply a very large dampening impact of net taxes on economic uctuations in
the sixties and seventies, around 50 percent or more. However, these values have to be seen
with caution because when the negative endogenous component is overestimated - as in the
1960-61 and 1973-75 recessions - the same will happen with the mentioned impact (note that
the multiplier, as a relative indicator, is not a¤ected by this problem). At the same time, it
is natural that I get gures larger than in previous studies, such as Auerbach and Feenberg
(2000) and Cohen and Follete (2000)23, because the scope of the policy measure I use is much
23Auerbach and Feenberg (2000) report simulations based on the NBER TAXSIM model. Cohen and Follete
(2000) also present the results of simulations, using a large-scale macroeconometric model for the US (FRB/US).
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broader than theirs. On the one hand, it includes transfers and state and local government taxes
(these are about 40 per cent of total taxes during the sample period, mostly indirect taxes). On
the other hand, it also reects the contribution of discretionary policy. Those studies came to
benchmark dampening impacts of about 8 per cent (for aggregate demand shocks).
Systematic monetary policy seems to have had a more modest stabilizing role than scal
policy in the past, even taking into account a certain degree of overestimation of the latters
role. On average the dampening e¤ect is estimated at around 10 percent. This appears to
be due to its comparatively delayed full impact which takes more time to build up than the
length of the average contraction (note that the e¤ectiveness indicator for endogenous policy is
consistently much smaller than the one for exogenous policy). In the 1981-82 recession, which
was longer than average, the stabilizing role of monetary policy was more evident (this did not
happen for the 1973-75 episode, but note that the endogenous variation was particularly small
in the course of it). This suggests that - except for more protracted recessions - monetary policy
has contributed particularly to strengthen recoveries. It is worth noting that the identication
assumption that monetary policy has no impact on output within the quarter may contribute to
this result. In this case, it is di¢ cult to take out from the exercise any pattern of e¤ectiveness
of endogenous policy over time.
Figures in Table 5 indicate that government spending has played a minor role as a stabilizing
tool since mid-fties, with the exception of the 1981-82 recession. The large multiplier of en-
dogenous policy suggests, however, that it could have if it had been more used for that purpose.
Results also indicate that the reduction in e¤ectiveness was less marked and more concentrated
toward the end of the sample than in the case of net taxes.
7 Conclusions
In this paper an SVAR system was estimated, identifying monetary and scal policy distur-
bances. Standard SVAR tools and counterfactual simulations were used to gauge the stabilizing
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impact of systematic and non-systematic policies, using data from 1955 to 2005. The following
main conclusions were reached:
 Policy disturbances were much less destabilizing in the post-1980 years both on the scal
and monetary sides. This result is mainly explained by a smaller impact of those distur-
bances on output and, to a lesser extent, by a smaller variance of policy shocks (in the cases
of the federal funds rate and government spending). The impact of exogenous policies on
output has weakened in the recent decades, this trend being particularly evident for net
taxes.
 Net taxes have a large endogenous content featuring a high degree of responsiveness to
output, and there has been an increase in such responsiveness over time (possibly reecting
discretionary policy). In contrast, government expenditure is mostly driven by own shocks.
The federal funds rate responds strongly to the economy as well, in line with the operation
of the monetary policy rule. An analysis of the variation in the strength of that response
over time was inconclusive.
 The main stabilizing force during the activity contractions since the beginning of the
sample until the eighties were taxes net of transfers, as measured by the reduction in output
foregone at the trough of recessions. However, a marked lost of e¤ectiveness appears to
have occurred in the recent period. Government spending played a small stabilizing role
over the whole sample.
 Monetary policy has contributed comparatively less to o¤set the downturns in activity
during postwar contractions, due to the comparatively slower build-up of the impact on
output. This suggests a particularly important contribution to enhance growth at the
initial stage of the recoveries.
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8 Appendices
A Detailed computation of the contemporaneous scal elastici-
ties
A.1 Personal income taxes
The derivation of theoretical expressions for the elasticity to GDP, prices and the interest rate
of personal income taxes (which also applies with small changes to the elasticity of social con-
tributions to activity and prices) is a bit more involved than for the remaining types of taxes.
I assume that the personal income tax base reacts to prices, as nominal wages adjust to it to
some degree, and also to the short-term interest rate, as the latter a¤ects asset income earned
by households. Each individual in the population (assumed to be equal to the labor force)
earns labour income and/or asset income. Let the real personal income tax revenue be given by
T = [t((W (L;P ) + A(FF ))(W (L;P ) + A(FF ))L(Y )]=P where t(:) is the average tax rate, W
the nominal wage, A individual income on assets, P prices, L employment, Y GDP and FF the
federal funds rate.1 The nominal tax base per worker is B =W +A. I assume that the income
on assets reacts contemporaneously only to the federal funds rate because, as regards personal
interest income, the underlying stock is mostly determined by past economic conditions, while
dividends are also linked to past prots.
The elasticity of real personal income tax revenue to output is given by
aPIT;Y=
@ lnT
@ lnY
=
@ ln t
@ lnW
@ lnW
@ lnL
d lnL
d lnY
+
@ lnB
@ lnW
@ lnW
@ lnL
d lnL
d lnY
+
d lnL
d lnY
(A1)
= aW;LaL;Y (at;W + sW ) + aL;Y ,
1 I assumed in the computation of the elasticities of purchases of goods and services that the wage bill in the
government sector does not respond to macroeconomic developments (see below). One would have to consider a
separate elasticity for governments wage bill, as a component of the tax base, to be fully consistent. I have not
done so, in order to simplify matters.
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where aW;L the elasticity of wages to employment, aL;Y the elasticity of employment to output,
at;W is the elasticity of the (average) tax rate to the wage and sW =
W
W+A is the share of labour
income in total income. Note that the expression for aPIT;Y appearing in OECDs work (in
Giorno et al. (1995)) corresponds to the one above but with sW is equal to 1, as they consider
labor income only.
The elasticity of the real tax revenue to prices is given by
aPIT;P =
@ lnT
@ lnP
=
@ ln t
@ lnW
@ lnW
@ lnP
+
@ lnB
@ lnW
@ lnW
@ lnP
  1=4 = aW;P (at;W + sW )  1=4, (A2)
in which aW;P is the elasticity of wages to prices and the changes in prices are measured at
annual rates.
The semi-elasticity of real tax revenue to the short-term interest rate is given by
aPIT;FF =
@ lnT
@FF
=
@ ln t
@ lnA
d lnA
dFF
+
@ lnB
@ lnA
d lnA
dFF
= aA;FF (at;A + sA), (A3)
where aA;FF is the semi-elasticity of asset income to the interest rate and sA =
A
W+A is the share
of asset income in total income.
The expressions above are based on the partial derivatives of the real income tax revenue
with respect to each one of the variables of interest which assume, by denition, that the other
variables in the expressions remain constant. This assumption does not raise problems because
such partial e¤ect is exactly what the contemporaneous coe¢ cients in the structural equations
are supposed to measure.2 I now examine the assumptions underlying the computation of the
elasticities of the average tax rate to the wage and asset income per worker, at;W and at;A (the
remaining parameters are estimated by means of econometric regressions - see below). It is clear
that these elasticities will not be constant throughout the wage and asset income distribution.
2That is, the derivative of real direct taxes with respect to Y assumes that FF and P are unchanged when Y
varies. Of course, when GDP changes, the federal funds rate and prices may change as well, but this is captured
by other contemporaneous coe¢ cients than ant;y0 .
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Nevertheless, one needs a summary measure in order to compute the gures using the expressions
given above. The OECD approach copes with this, for the labor income case, by computing
the average and the marginal tax rates of a representative family with certain characteristics, at
di¤erent points of the wage distribution. Afterwards a weighted average of each of the two tax
rates is computed on the basis of the weight of wage income at each point in total. The ratio
of the two weighted averages yields the summary elasticity measure. This procedure is carried
out for several years so to incorporate modications in the tax code.
In order to describe precisely how to extend this procedure to the case of labor and asset
income, and to illustrate the di¢ culties to compute at;A , I now denote with ij the magnitudes
above evaluated at the arbitrary cohort (W i; Aj) of the wage and individual asset income dis-
tribution, and without ij the corresponding aggregate magnitudes. Assuming that the elasticity
to the base at a given cohort (W i; Aj) is the same irrespective of whether there is a marginal
variation in the wage or individual asset income3, and denoting that elasticity by aijt;B, then one
can write aijt;W=s
ij
W
aijt;B and a
ij
t;A
=sij
A
aijt;B. The corresponding aggregate elasticities are given by
at;W=
P
i
P
j 
ijsij
W
aijt;B and at;A=
P
i
P
j 
ijsij
A
aijt;B, (A4)
where the ijs are the weights computed as the share of wage and asset income associated
with the cohort (W i; Aj) in total income from both sources (ij = LijBij=
P
i
P
j L
ijBij with
Bij equal to W i + Aj and Lij equal to the number of individuals associated with the cohort
(W i; Aj)). The computation of precise gures for at;W and at;A would thus require information
about the distribution of (W;A) and the corresponding values for aijt;B, for several years, which
is not available.
Nevertheless, the OECD gure should provide a good basis to compute at;W . Note that, if
aijt;B was constant for a given wage levelW
i (i.e. it did not depend upon j because all individuals
would concentrate in a given cohort A), then at;W=sW
P
i  
i
W
ait;B would hold, with the weights
3This may not happen for every (W i; Aj). For instance, if there are tax deductions applying only to labor
income, say the rst $X dollars of employment income are exempt from tax, then for wage levels below $X the
marginal change in tax revenue is zero when the wage changes but positive when asset income changes.
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 i
W
given by the share of wage income associated with the cohort W i in total, according to
the marginal distribution of W . This relationship should provide a reasonable approximation
in practice, as there is a higher concentration of individuals (at lower cohorts) for individual
asset income than for wages. Further, as labor income represents the bulk of personal income,
the elasticities calculated considering only labor income as the tax base (as in OECD) should
not be too far from ait;B. By contrast, such elasticities and information about the the marginal
distribution of W would not be suitable for the calibration of at;A .
The OECD gures correspond to
P
i  
i
W
ait;B + 1 (as they refer to the elasticity of the tax
revenue not of the tax rate) and vary considerably over time, ranging from 1:3 to 3:9 over the last
three decades. The computation of aggregate gures for the shares of labor and asset income -
sW and sA - does not raise problems since they are just the shares of wage and asset income for
the economy as a whole4 (see Appendix B for the series used). The gure for sW ranges from
0:75 to 0:85 over the period 1955:1-2005:4.
The remaining parameters in (A1) and (A2) are computed through econometric regressions,
following the method in Blanchard and Perotti (2002). Specically, a^W;L = 0:33[t^ = 4:0] and
a^W;P = 0:09[t^ = 1:6] are the lag 0 coe¢ cients of a regression of log change in wages on the rst
lead and lags 0 to 4 of log change in employment and change in annualized ination (sample
1955:1-2005:4).5 Note that I take as the price variable ination measured at annual rates.
Likewise a^L;Y =0:68[t^ = 12:1] is the lag 0 coe¢ cient of a regression of log change in employment
on the rst lead and lags 0 to 4 of log change in GDP. The average gures for a^PIT;Y and a^PIT;P
are equal, respectively, to 1:1 and  0:09.
A.2 Social security contributions
The responses of social contributions are based on the corresponding expression for the real
revenue T = [t((W (L;P ))W (L;P )L(Y )]=P , where t(:) is the average tax rate and the other
4As sW =
P
i
P
j 
ijsij
W
and sA=
P
i
P
j 
ijsij
A
.
5One could raise the issue of simultaneity in relation to the regressions used to compute some of the parameters
in (A1) and analogous expressions. I checked the results of corresponding regressions excluding the leads and using
lags of the right-hand side variables as instruments and they di¤ered by little.
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variables are as above. The elasticities of real social contributions revenue to output and prices
are, respectively,
aSC;Y=
@ ln t
@ lnW
@ lnW
@ lnL
d lnL
d lnY
+
@ lnW
@ lnL
d lnL
d lnY
+
d lnL
d lnY
= aW;LaL;Y (at;W + 1) + aL;Y , (A5)
aSC;P =
@ ln t
@ lnW
@ lnW
@ lnP
+
@ lnW
@ lnP
  1=4 = aW;P (1 + at;W )  1=4. (A6)
The average gures for a^SC;Y and a^SC;P are equal, respectively, to 0:88 and  0:17.
A.3 Corporate income taxes
The tax base of the corporate income tax, corporate prots, is supposed to react to GDP and
prices. I assume that the tax is proportional (note further that the corporate income tax is
recorded on an accrual basis by NIPAs, which should approximately undo the lag between the
earning of prots and the payment of the tax). Therefore, real corporate income tax revenue is
given by T = tPR(Y; P )=P , where t is the tax rate and PR are corporate prots. The elasticities
of corporate income taxes to GDP and prices are, respectively,
aCIT;Y =
@ lnPR
@ lnY
= aPR;Y , (A7)
aCIT;P =
@ lnPR
@ lnP
  1 = aPR;P   1=4, (A8)
where aPR;Y and aPR;P are the elasticities of prots to GDP and prices. These parameters were
computed as the coe¢ cients for lag 0 of a regression of the rst di¤erences of log prots on
the rst lead and lags 0 to 4 of the change in log GDP and the change in annualized ination.
This yielded a^PR;Y = 4:6[t^ = 10:4] and a^PR;P = 1:8[t^ = 4:7]. Accordingly, a^CIT;Y = 4:6 and
a^CIT;P = 1:6.
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A.4 Indirect taxes
The tax base of indirect taxes is assumed to be nominal GDP and the tax to be proportional.
The revenue of indirect taxes in real terms is given by T = tY , where t is the tax rate, implying
a 1.0 elasticity to activity and a 0.0 elasticity to prices.
A.5 Transfers to households
Transfers to households are expected to only to activity mainly through unemployment insurance
payments. Such payments have represented on average only about 3 percent of social benets
over the last decade, though at the beginning of the sample they represented a bit more than
that, averaging 5 to10 percent. Let real transfers to households be equal to T = ( T+UB(Y ))=P ,
where T is the component of transfers that does not react to activity and UB(Y ) is the amount
of unemployment benets. The elasticity of transfers to households to GDP is approximately
(ignoring the term related to the response of labor force to the business cycle) given by
aTH;Y = sUB
d lnUB
d lnY
= sUB
du
d lnY
1
u
= sUBau;Y
1
u
, (A9)
where sUB is the share of unemployment benets in total transfers, au;Y is the unit variation of
the unemployment rate in response to a 1 percent increase in GDP and u is the unemployment
rate. I set au;Y equal to -0.24 from Blanchard (1989). The average gure for a^TH;Y is -0.26.
As to the contemporaneous response to prices, many categories of social benets such as old-
age and unemployment benets are not indexed within the quarter, and thus a -1.0 elasticity for
real outlays seems adequate. By contrast payments related to health programs are likely to be
sensitive to change in prices. I assume for them a zero elasticity in real terms. These payments
were rather small in the fties and sixties, but they have become one of the most important
components of social benets, weighting currently over 40 percent. The elasticity of transfers to
households to prices is based on an expression analogous to the one above, but picking out the
part of transfers that reacts to prices, i.e. health benets. That is,
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aTH;P =
d lnT
d lnP
= (sHB   1)=4, (A10)
where sHB is the share of health benets in total. The average gure for a^TH;P is -0.19.
A.6 Purchases of goods and services
Purchases of goods and services are composed of compensation of government employees and
intermediate consumption and investment (one does not have to consider here the consumption
of xed capital since it is excluded from the measure of purchases used - see Appendix B). The
share of compensation of employees in total was slightly below 50 per cent in the initial years of
the sample, but it has represented a bit more than half of the total since mid-sixties. In general
one expects intermediate consumption and investment spending to be determined by the nominal
amount budgeted, implying a -1.0 elasticity of real purchases to contemporaneous ination. Also
the wage updating process in the government sector is such that price developments typically
a¤ect wages with some lag. There may be indexation but with a certain delay, for instance, pay
adjustments for the blue-collar occupations in the Federal government (Federal Wage System)
are indexed to lagged changes in private sector wages, according to the areas where the services
are located (see O¤ice for Personnel Management (2002)). The semi-elasticity of real purchases
of goods and services to annualized changes in prices is assumed to be constant:
a^G;P =  1=4. (A11)
B Variable denition and data sources
Fiscal data are from NIPAs Table 3.1. Government Current Receipts and Expenditures ; data on the components
of government consumption, including the breakdown defense/non-defense, are from NIPAs Table 3.10.5 Gov-
ernment Consumption Expenditures and General Government Gross Output ; data on social benets including
unemployment and health-related benets are from NIPAs Table 3.12. Government social benets (annual data,
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the share for the year as a whole was assumed for the quarter).
Taxes = Personal current taxes + Taxes on production and imports + Taxes on corporate income + Contributions
for government social insurance + Capital transfer receipts (the latter item is composed mostly by gift and
inheritance taxes).
Transfers = Subsidies + Government social benets to persons + capital transfers paid - Current transfer receipts
(from business and persons).
Net taxes = Taxes - Transfers.
Purchases of goods and services = Government consumption - Consumption of xed capital1 + Government
investment.
Gross domestic product is from NIPAs Table 1.1.5. Gross Domestic Product.
Gross domestic product deator is from NIPAs Table 1.1.4. Price Indexes for Gross Domestic Product.
Federal funds rate (quarterly averages of daily data) is from the FRED database (Federal Reserve Bank of St.
Louis).
Population is from NIPAs Table 2.1. Personal income and its Disposition.
Federal debt held by the public (Section 3.1) is from the FRED database (Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis).
Labor income and personal asset income (Section 3.2 and Appendix A) are equal, respectively, to wages and salaries
and to the sum of interest income, dividend income and rental income, all from NIPAs Table 2.1. Personal income
and its Disposition. Proprietorsincome was not considered, since there is no obvious way to allocate it between
labor and asset income.
Employment in the manufacturing and Average hourly earnings in the manufacturing (Appendix A) are from the
FRED database (Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis).
Corporate prots (Appendix A) is from NIPAs Table 1.10. Gross domestic income, by type of income (the
inventory valuation and capital consumption adjustments were undone).
1Consumption of xed capital is excluded on two grounds. Firstly, there are no shocks to this variable which is
fully determined by the existing capital stock and depreciation rules. Secondly, from the viewpoint of the impact
on aggregate demand, it is the cost of capital goods at time of acquisition (already recorded in government
investment) that matters and not at time of consumption.
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